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ABSTRACT
In response to recently increased environmental dynamism and uncertainty,
organizations have tried to become more flexible by changing traditional organizational
forms and creating new ones. The new forms in turn create new areas of research to
emerge. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine one such new organizational
form, the formation of strategic committees (SCs) within companies. Extending
liabilities of newness and upper echelons theories, I examine three primary questions in
three essays: (1) is it possible to accurately predict which firms have SCs and do these
firms outperform firms without SCs; (2) in what type of industries are SCs beneficial to
firm performance; and (3) what SC characteristics lead to better firm performance?
Analyses of a comprehensive set of data on international firms with SCs show that
environmental factors can be used to identify firms with SCs, SCs are beneficial to firm
performance in mature, non-hypercompetitive and flat experience industries, and SCs
with greater tenure and educational heterogeneity will have better performance and
performance stability, respectively. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of
my study for strategy research on liabilities of newness and upper echelons.
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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
The global business environment has become more competitive in recent years
as more businesses venture into the international marketplace. Due to the increasing
number of competitors and the changing environment, organizations have begun to
change traditional organizational forms and/or creating new ones (Schilling and
Steensma, 2001). These new organizational forms in turn create new opportunities for
research (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). The purpose of this three paper dissertation is to
look at one such organizational form, strategic committees.
Little research on strategic committees exists. Prior studies have focused on
audit committees, technology committees, or top management teams, but no research
studies have examined the strategic committee. This is unfortunate because the number
of strategic committees has grown drastically within the past decade; since 2003, the
number of firms with strategic committees has grown from around 300 to well over 900.
Thus, strategic committees appear to be a topic worth exploring.
To begin I ask a simple question: what is a strategic committee? A cursory
examination of the literature suggests that a strategic committee is typically a
subcommittee of the board of directors. Composition of the committee varies by
country and appears to be in part dependent on home country regulations. In some
countries, like the United States, strategic committees are comprised of independent, or
external, directors. In other countries, like India, strategic committees are comprised of
internal and non-executives members in addition to external directors. Strategic
1

committees appear to be subcommittees of the board of directors with independent
directors, upper level management, and/or lower level organizational employees as
members.
To examine strategic committees, two theories will be used: liabilities of newness
and upper echelons theory. The first theoretical lens, liabilities of newness, proposes
“newer” firms are more likely to fail as they lack experience, resources, and legitimacy.
This theory began with Stinchcombe‟s (1965) seminal piece entitled “Social Structures
and Organizations.” He proposed that failure was greater in newer firms because 1) the
high costs associated with learning new roles and tasks; 2) inefficiencies stemming from
imperfect resources and routines; 3) inefficient operations as a result of informal
communication systems; and 4) weak ties with customers and suppliers. These
theorized components were later supported through theoretical and empirical findings
(Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; Goldberg, Cohen, and Giegenbaum, 2003; Shepherd et al.,
2000; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 1983). While there may be large,
experienced firms with strategic committees, we predict that the typical firm with a
strategic committee is smaller and less experienced.
The second theoretical prism is the upper echelons perspective first developed by
Hambrick and Mason (1984) in their seminal piece entitled “Upper Echelons: The
Organization as a Reflection of its Top Managers.” Upper echelons theory postulates
that top management team (TMT) characteristics influence organizational outcomes.
Prior research has empirically supported this theory by showing that TMT member age
(Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; Tihanyi et al., 2000), tenure (Bergh, 2001; Herrmann and
2

Datta, 2005), education (Jensen and Zajac, 2004), and heterogeneity (Lee and Park, 2006)
influence the strategic posture of firms (Patzelt, zu Knyphausen-Aufse, and Nikil, 2008).
In addition, using upper echelons to focus on executive groups tends to explain
organization outcomes better than by solely focusing on CEOs or individual leaders
(Hambrick, 2007). As Daft and Lewin (1993) note, researchers can have a greater impact
by focusing on midrange phenomena. Moreover, according to Hambrick (2007)
research may benefit by focusing on „subteams‟; one such group or “subteam” may be
strategic committees.
In this dissertation three research papers examine currently unexamined issues
related to strategic committees. First, there appears to be no systematic research
examining why strategic committees exist despite the growing number of strategic
committees being formed by international companies. It is not known why these
committees are being formed. Is it related to an increase in external pressures to
improve transparency (i.e., Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002) or stakeholder pressure to
improve long-term viability of the company? Moreover, why have some firms created
strategic committees while others have not?
Second, people are familiar with the more common committees of the board of
directors, like the audit, nomination, and acquisition committees (Andriole, 2009). Since
these committees are more common, more information is readily available allowing
scholars to do empirical research. However, because these committees are relatively
new, they are not well known and therefore unexplored.

3

Third, I wonder, if strategic committees are being formed to aid firm strategy
making and structure, are they actually beneficial? Overtime, as firms age, they alter
structures to meet strategic changes (Harris and Ruefli, 2000) formalizing approaches to
planning and resource allocation to coordinate the increased number of firm actions
(Hart and Banburry, 1994). Do strategic committees help or hinder this process?
To address the above identified problems, this dissertation seeks to answer three
research questions regarding strategic committees. First, is it possible to accurately
predict which firms have strategic committees (SCs) and do these firms outperform
firms without strategic committees? Second, in what type of industries are strategic
committees beneficial to firm performance? Lastly, what strategic committee
characteristics lead to better firm performance?
The dissertation is broken into three separate essays. Paper one seeks to predict
which firms are more likely to have a strategic committee based on internal and external
environmental factors (H1 – H5). In addition, I propose firms that are predicted to have
strategic committees will on average perform better than firms without strategic
committees (H6). Essay two explores industry characteristics in which the use of a
strategic committee will be most beneficial to firm performance (H7-H9). Lastly, paper
three examines strategic committee member characteristics and firm performance (H10H12).
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ESSAY 1 – PREDICTING STRATEGIC COMMITTEES VIA INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
INTRODUCTION
Literature has extensively studied the relationship between organizational
structure and the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Sine, Mitsuhashi, and
Kirsch, 2006). For instance, more intense competition stemming from the development
of new domestic markets as well as the growth in international business has resulted in
some firms experimenting with new organizational structures (Lee, MacDermid, and
Buck, 2000). In addition, government regulations like the Sarbanes Oxley Act have also
influenced how organizations structure themselves (Ogneva, Subramanyam, and
Raghunandan, 2007).
This paper focuses on one new organizational structure, the strategic committee.
While there is some anecdotal evidence concerning strategic committees, there appears
to be no systematic research examining them. This is of particular interest because
strategic committees are a fairly recent, yet international occurrence; e.g. the number of
international firms with a strategic committee (SC) has grown from around 300 in 2003
to over 900 in 2008 (the average SC age is about 4 years). Thus, the number almost
tripled in only five years. Why is this occurring?
Let‟s begin by asking what exactly is a strategic committee? A cursory empirical
examination suggests that the SC is a subcommittee of the board of directors. However,
due to different governmental regulations on board composition requirements strategic
committee composition varies by country. For example, in the United States the
5

Securities and Exchange Commission requires the majority of board members to be
independent directors, or external members with no affiliation to the organization.
Conversely, companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange have only one-third
independent directors with the remaining comprised of executive and non-executive
directors. Even though the strategic committee is a subcommittee of the board of
directors, it is comprised of independent directors, upper level management, and/or
lower level organizational employees.
Why are these strategic committees being formed? The answer is not apparent; it
may vary by country as well as changes in business environments. For instance with
respect to the USA, based on the average age of the SC, the committees could be a
response to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. For example, the U.S. company GeoEye
states in the Strategy and Risk Committee Charter that was adopted in 2007 (p1):
“The Strategy Committee (the “Committee”) shall assist the Board in ensuring that
corporate leadership has a vision beyond the past quarter and the coming quarter and is
actively aware of opportunities and risks to future share holders’ value”
Second, outside of the USA, based on proxy and annual reports, SCs may be formed to
examine overall firm strategies aimed at improving the long-term viability of the
company. For example, in the 2007 annual report for Shanghai Forte Land Co., Ltd.,
they state (p45):
“The Strategy Committee will timely discuss the strategic planning for the development
of the Company in the medium and long term.”

6

Thus, SCs may have come into existence in response to pressures for organization
transparency and/or to improve the chances for long term firm viability. However,
only some firms have created these committees while others have not. Why might this
be the case? In this paper an attempt is made to answer this question.
The purpose of this paper is to combine a “liabilities of newness” perspective
with an industry stability perspective to predict which firms are most likely to have a
strategic committee. Using a liability of newness perspective I hypothesize that
“newer” firms (those with less experience, fewer resources, and legitimacy [i.e.,
transparency]) are more likely to have created a SC because it aids firm legitimacy
allowing a greater resource and experience base to be created. I also hypothesize using
an industry stability perspective that firms in more stable industries are more likely to
have a SC because in such industries growth opportunities approach a zero sum game
(Day and Montgomery, 1999; Hanssens and Johansson, 1991); thus long term firm
viability depends upon more efficient and effective uses of firm resources than in high
growth industries (which tend to be more innovation driven (Davis, Eisenhardt, and
Bingham, 2009; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). Third, integrating both perspectives, I
hypothesize that the probability of a firm having a SC increases with firms having less
experience and fewer resources in more stable industries. Finally, I hypothesize that the
three prior hypotheses are normative as well as descriptive; such firms having a SC will
on average perform better than firms that do not have SCs. These hypotheses are tested
on a sample of 652 international firms.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Liabilities of Newness

The liabilities of newness literature began with Stinchcombe‟s seminal piece in
1965. Stinchcombe proposed that young firms are more prone for failure because they
lack the necessary experience, resources, and legitimacy needed for survival. More
specifically he hypothesized that new firms are more likely to fail compared to older
firms because of: 1) costs associated with learning new roles and tasks; 2) limited
resources and routines to operate efficiently; 3) inefficiencies created from a lack of
informal communication structures; and 4) few formal connections with customers and
suppliers (Knott, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965). His hypotheses were supported by later
efforts that found for young firms failure is often associated with internal factors of
small size, inefficient structure, and lack of experience and external factors linked to a
limited network and market resources (Carayannopoulos, 2009; Freeman, Carroll, and
Hannan, 1983).
A common challenge facing any organization is that firms are limited in the
resources they possess (Lin, Yang, and Demirkan, 2007; Park, Chen, and Gallagher,
2002). Large firms tend to have more resources which typically lead to advantages in
economies of scale, experience, brand name recognition, and market power (Chen and
Hambrick, 1995; Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day, 1982).
Conversely, the typical small firm has resources that are insufficient to address
the demands of the environment (Sapienza et al., 2006; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990).
Moreover, young firms typically lack the experience and routines needed to establish
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efficient and effective operations hindering the firm from seeking needed resources to
improve overall efficiencies and effectiveness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986;
Carayannopoulos, 2009). As a result, young firms may lack the necessary knowledge to
determine what they are capable of doing or should do with current resources to
properly execute firm strategies.
Another hindrance commonly associated with young firms is a lack of
legitimacy. Legitimacy can be described as environmental acceptance of the
organization based on the perception that the organization is meaningful, predictable,
and trustworthy (Hannan and Freeman, 1976; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).
A young firm may not have had a chance to establish itself within a market limiting its
exposure and ability to convey information to the environment (Stuart, Hoang, and
Hybels, 1999). Second, young firms have not had ample time to develop proper
decision-making guidelines, routines, and sequences to be applied on a consistent basis
(Choi and Shepherd, 2005). Thus, young firms may lack legitimacy because there is
limited information available and organizational processes may be unreliable due to
newness of the firm.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

When do firms create strategic committees: when they are experienced or
inexperienced; when they have/lack abundant resources; or when they operate in a
stable/high velocity industry? Previous literature suggests that firms may have greater
need of strategic co-ordination when they are less experienced, have fewer resources

9

and operate in more mature (stable) industries (Chrisman, Bauerschmidt and Hofer,
1998; Lechner and Leyronas, 2009).
Experienced vs. Inexperienced firms
It is important for firms to identify factors within their competitive space that
influence firm performance (Caves and Porter, 1977; Mascarenhas and Aaker, 1989;
Olusoga, Mokwa, and Noble, 1995). Young firms are often at a disadvantage in this
regard because management needs time to develop firm-specific knowledge, skills, and
abilities (Thornhill and Amit, 2003). Put simply, young firms lack the necessary
experience to identify and exploit key factors within the competitive environment that
could benefit firm performance. By creating a strategic committee, the firm can rely on
the experiences of the committee members to compensate for the organization‟s lack of
knowledge and operations due to young firm age.
In addition, young firms often lack legitimacy within their environments.
Strategies to achieve legitimacy tend to be selected based on interpretations of and
relative position to competitors (White, 2001). However, young firms have attempted to
gain legitimacy quicker by adopting structures and practices that have been previously
implemented by competitors (Dobrev, 2007), but often lack true legitimacy because
there is not sufficient information to assess the firm‟s predictability and reliability
(Carayannopoulos, 2009; Suchman, 1995).
Less experienced firms may have greater need of a SC than more experienced
firms because they lack the necessary knowledge and legitimacy to compete effectively
within their environment. Establishing a SC allows organizations to pool experiences of
10

its committee members to create a larger knowledge base. Proper strategies can then be
developed to exploit firm resources so the firm may compete more effectively. In
addition, the strategy making process becomes more visible aiding firm legitimacy
within the environment; creating a SC distributes more information to the external
environment aiding the assessment of a firm‟s predictability and reliability. Thus, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Less experienced firms are more likely to have strategic committees.
Resource abundant vs. Less resource abundant firms
Firm size has been used as an indicator for a firm‟s resource constraints (Lin et
al., 2007). Greater firm size acts as a shield to enhance viability among competitive
pressures and environmental shocks (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Makadok and
Walker, 1996), but does not necessarily increase firm competiveness (Barnett, 1997;
Madsen and Walker, 2007).
Large firms are positioned more strategically though as they are able to produce
a degree of resource certainty to ensure sustained feasibility (Hannan, Pólos, and
Carroll, 2003; Lin et al., 2007). Large organizations have less resource constraints
because of a greater resource base created through firm legitimacy; large size equals
past success (Baum and Oliver, 1991), more visible actions (Chen and Hambrick, 1995),
and readily available information (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). By creating
legitimacy, firms are able to create a larger resource base (Audia, Freeman, and
Reynolds, 2006).
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Small firms, however, face greater resource constraints. While large firms may be
able to endure environmental shocks, small firms have limited resources and lower
margins for error (Hannan et al., 2003; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). This simply means
that the viability of small firms is threatened because improper use of resources could
mean organizational failure. It becomes increasingly important then for small firms to
obtain additional resources, but competition intensifies as firms position themselves
strategically for finite amount resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Thus it becomes
necessary for small firms to develop some legitimacy within the environment to grow
the organization‟s resource base.
Small firms lack a proven track record, are not easily visible, and information is
limited creating legitimacy problems (Stuart et al., 1999). In order to overcome this
problem, a firm may decide to form a SC. First, the experience of SC members acts as a
track record for the organization. Second, the committee becomes visible to potential
stakeholders. Lastly, the SC increases the amount of information on firm decision
making processes. Therefore for a smaller firm, establishing a SC has the potential to
increase firm legitimacy and/or increase resources. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Less resource abundant firms are more likely to have strategic committees.
Stable vs. High velocity industries
A key influence on the decision making processes of the firm is the degree of
industry stability (Duncan, 1972; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Stable, less dynamic
industries are typically associated as having little change in customer preferences,
technologies, and competitive technologies (Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick, 2006).
12

Customer demand remains relatively the same allowing the organization to produce
goods or services with little modifications or alterations (Cui, Griffith, and Cavusgil,
2005); greater demand certainty allows firms within these environments to process
information and devise strategic plans accordingly (Grewal and Tansuhaj, 2001).
Sustainable competitive advantage in such industries tends to be created primarily
through differentiation strategies in which resources are strongly linked to active
systems (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2008).
Firms in stable markets begin to be perceived as producing commodities driving
down the rate of return for organizations (Cui et al., 2005). However, as competition
intensifies firms are more likely to find themselves in zero-sum relationships (Barnett,
1997). In stable markets it becomes vital for organizations to create strategies to
differentiate themselves from the competitors. Establishing a SC is one method firms
use to help develop firm strategies to aid the firm in stable markets.
Hypothesis 3: Firms operating in stable environments are more likely to have strategic
committees.
Strategic committees, firm experience, and industry stability
Some literature has identified management as a source of competitive advantage
(Coff, 1997; Thornhill and Amit, 2003). However, in young firms typically management
is learning how to manage and have not had enough time to develop skills that may
lead to a competitive advantage (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2003). In addition, young
firms lack a proven track record in their environment and managers make decisions
under conditions of extreme uncertainty (John, Pouder, and Cannon, 2003).
13

While management may be making decisions under extreme uncertainty, stable
markets create some clarity and may help inexperienced firms focus (Nickerson and
Zenger, 2002; Wright, Westhead, and Sohl, 1998). Forming a strategic committee may
allow a young firm in a stable market to better create more effective strategies by
pooling the experiences of a specially chosen subset of their board of directors. Put
simply, the experiences of the strategic committee can be used in stable markets to
increase the competitiveness of the firm. Hence, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Strategic committees are more likely to be present in less experienced firms
operating in stable markets.
Strategic committees, firm resources, and industry stability
Firms are constrained by organizational characteristics and the external
environment (Lin et al., 2007). First, young firms typically have fewer resources and for
that reason are more susceptible to environmental shocks. Second, industry
competition can restrict the resources available and reduce young firm survivability
(Romanelli, 1989). Moreover, as young firms redirect scarce resources to training
employees and establishing routines toward efficiencies, survivability diminishes
(Henderson, 1999).
In order to improve survivability it is important for young firms to properly
align their limited organizational resources with the external environment. A strategic
committee comprised of selected board members may be the best option for younger
firms in stable markets to develop strategies that most effectively use their limited
organizational resources. I hypothesize:
14

Hypothesis 5: Strategic committees are more likely to be present in less resource abundant
firms operating in stable markets.
Strategic committees and performance
The above hypotheses are descriptive in nature but are they normative as well? I
hypothesize that firms that are less experienced, less resource abundant and operating
in stable markets and that also have SCs will on average have higher levels of
performance than firms that do not have SCs with similar internal and external
environmental characteristics. Thus, we do not hypothesize that creating an SC will
lead to improved performance for all firms, just firms that are less experienced, less
resource abundant and operating in stable markets. Our logic is as follows.
Less experienced firms tend to be disadvantaged when their top management
team lacks experience (Thornhill and Amit, 2003). One way to remedy this shortcoming
is to create an experienced SC that can develop and implement effective strategies and
as a result, improve firm performance. Less experienced firms also tend to lack
legitimacy (Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965) which may have an impact on
their ability to obtain critical resources. An experienced SC can convey legitimacy
making it easier for the firm to obtain such resources, thereby improving firm
performance.
Lastly, stable markets tend to have greater competitive pressures making it
harder for firms to perform well (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2008; Cui et al., 2005). In
particular, less experienced firms are at risk in such markets because they are
competing against experienced firms with proven strategies. Once again an experienced
15

SC can have a positive effect on the bottom line by developing effective differentiation
strategies and focusing on proper organizational controls. Thus, based on the above
discussion we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 6: Based on the prior hypotheses, firms with a strategic committee will on
average outperform firms without a strategic committee.

METHODOLOGY
Sample

For the current study, I created a sample obtained from Capital IQ, a division of
Standard & Poor‟s, comprised of international firms with and without strategic
committees. To be included in the sample, firms needed to be listed publically in any
world stock exchange. In addition, I followed Porter (1979) to create two groups of
firms, “industry leaders” and firms with strategic committees, “followers”. Simple ttests showed that firms with a SC were significantly smaller in terms of size and
revenues when compared to a random sample of the industry population. I first
summed the industry sales of firms with a SC, which totaled 35% of industry sales. I
then summed the sales of successively industry leaders until industry sales equaled 35%
(Porter, 1979).
The time frame is 2004-2008 and was chosen because it is the most current time
frame available. Using these three criteria to select my sample but removing cases with
missing data resulted in a final sample of 652 international firms across ten industries.

16

Dependent Variables

In this study, I use two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is
coded as „1‟ if a firm had a strategic committee and „0‟ otherwise. The firms‟ 10-K, 8-K,
Proxy Statements, and Annual Glossy Reports from the Capital IQ database were used
to determine if a firm had a strategic committee for the years 2004-08. A search for the
terms “strategy committee”, “strategic committee”, “business development committee”,
and/or “strategy” was done. A firm was coded as having a strategic committee if I
identified it in the 2004-08 time period.
The second dependent variable is firm performance. Following prior literature,
Return on Assets (ROA) (Kalyta, 2009; McDonald and Westphal, 2010) was used for firm
profitability. ROA was calculated as net income divided by total assets. Consistent with
prior literature (Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007), five-year averages of ROA
(2004-2008) were used to smooth annual fluctuations in accounting data.
Explanatory Variables

Market volatility
Market volatility is conceptually defined as the variance in industry performance
(Luo, 2007). The corresponding measure was defined as the instability of sales in each
industry to evaluate levels of environmental uncertainty from a continuous variable
(Bergh, 1998). Following Keats and Hitt (1988), industry sales were regressed against
time and the standard error of the slope coefficient was divided by average industry
sales (Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven, 2006). Larger
values represent greater market volatility.
Firm resources
17

The amount of resources a firm has impacts strategic choice. Larger firms often
have greater resources allowing them to pursue more aggressive strategies. Small firms
on the other hand typically have fewer resources and have to be more careful with how
critical resources are utilized. Prior research has examined firm resources as the
number of employees (Audretsch, Lehmann, and Plummer, 2009; Tzabbar, 2009) or firm
total assets (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Yoo et al., 2009). This study measures firm
resources as the number of firm employees instead of total assets to avoid
multicollinearity problems with the dependent variable ROA; the denominator in the
equation is total assets. Due to the high level of skewness in the total number of firm
employees, the variable firm resources was transformed by natural logarithm (Newbert,
2008). Higher values represent greater resources.
Firm experience
Firm age represents an organization‟s level of experience. As a firm ages it gains
knowledge and experience in establishing routines to improve efficiencies. Following
Greve (2009), firm experience is calculated as the year 2008 minus firm inception. Lower
values represent less experience.
Strategic committee
The last predictor variable examines the relationship between firms with and
without a strategic committee and firm performance. After identifying firms with a
strategic committee, they were coded as „1‟ for having a committee present, all else „0‟.
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Control Variables

The control variables for this study look at geographic region influences. In a
given industry, a number of country factors may influence performance; the level of
industry competition may vary by home country characteristics. In addition, the firm‟s
home market may be significantly larger than others. These factors might influence the
competitiveness of the firm and create unobserved home market heterogeneity (Rangan
and Sengul, 2009). A summary analysis of the data revealed that firms with strategic
committees were concentrated in five geographic regions. To account for these home
country specific factors in a regional setting (unobserved heterogeneity), I included five
geographic region dummies in the regression analyses.

ANALYSIS
I used two different analyses to examine the relationships among the predictor
and dependent variables, logistic regression and hierarchical OLS regression,
respectively. Prior to running the two analyses I examined the correlations between
variables. Table 1.1 shows substantial variability in the variables. Bivariate correlations
among control variables (Asia, Europe, and North America geographic dummy) were
high, which is expected since they measure the same construct, geographic location.
Further analysis using variance inflation factors (VIF) finds that VIF scores in the
second analysis ranged from a minimum of 1.68 to 16.65, indicating multicollinearity
problems (VIF scores exceeding 10). To remedy this problem of multicollinearity
among dummy coded variables, following Faugère and Van Erlach (2009), the constant
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was omitted from the equation and found that the VIF values ranged from 1.0 to 1.95,
well below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 1.1. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all study variables

Variable
1. Committee Present
2. Average ROA
3. Firm Resources
4. Firm Experience
5. Industry Stability
6. Africa Dummy
7. Asia Dummy
8. Europe Dummy
9. North America Dummy
N = 652
*** p < .001; * p < .05

Mean
S.D.
0.4900 0.5000
0.0267 0.1399
58771.6900 113963.1770
63.3700 48.1800
1.2333 0.8397
0.0107 0.1031
0.2665 0.4425
0.2680 0.4433
0.4395 0.4967

1
2
3
1
-0.141 *** 1
-0.157 *** 0.005
1
-0.383 *** 0.142 *** 0.039
-0.173 *** -0.004 -0.012
0.046 0.015 0.060
-0.087 * 0.080 * -0.011
-0.028 0.080 * -0.013
0.086 * -0.154 *** 0.001

4

5

1
0.093 * 1
0.028 0.003
-0.142 *** 0.071
0.172 *** -0.012
-0.030 -0.046

6

1
-0.063
-0.063
-0.092

7

8

9

1
-0.365 *** 1
-0.534 *** -0.536 *** 1

The relationship between environmental factors and strategic committee
presence was estimated using logistic regression analysis. This analysis is appropriate
for binary dependent variables because logistic regression assumes a categorical
dependent variable uses a binomial distribution. Since the dependent variable is
whether a strategic committee is present or not (“1” or “0”), a logistic regression
analysis is appropriate (Matta and Beamish, 2008).
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Table 1.2. Logistic regression analysis: committee presence a

Africa Dummy
Asia Dummy
Europe Dummy
North America Dummy
Firm Experience
Firm Resources
Industry Stability
Firm Experience * Industry Stability
Firm Resources * Industry Stability
-2 Log-likelihood
Model χ

2

Model (1)
β
S.E.
0.916 0.837
-0.325 * 0.154
-0.138 0.152
0.161 0.118

Model (3)
β
S.E.
3.601 *** 1.034
1.525 *** 0.383
2.197 *** 0.407
2.279 *** 0.390
-0.020 *** 0.002
-0.052 0.034
-0.336** 0.111
-0.005 * 0.002

Model (4)
β
S.E.
3.608 *** 1.204
1.536 *** 0.742
2.206 *** 0.740
2.291 *** 0.730
-0.020 *** 0.002
-0.056 0.000
-0.333** 0.121
0.025

0.032

Model (5)
β
S.E.
3.596 *** 1.043
1.539 *** 0.386
2.206 *** 0.409
2.291 *** 0.393
-0.020 *** 0.002
-0.056 0.034
-0.330** 0.114
0.014 0.002
-0.005 * 0.032

895.337

772.105

764.826

771.517

764.642

8.527

131.759***

139.038***

132.346***

139.222***

0.017
55.2

123.232***
0.244
68.9

7.278**
0.256
70.1

0.587
0.245
69.9

7.463*
0.256
70.4

2

Change in model χ
Nagelkerke R Square
Percent correctly classified

Model (2)
β
S.E.
3.623 *** 1.038
1.520 *** 0.383
2.199 *** 0.406
2.279 *** 0.390
-0.020 *** 0.002
-0.052 0.034
-0.342** 0.111

N = 652
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
a

β, unstandardized regression coefficients; S.E., standard error of the coefficients

Table 1.2 displays five sets of hierarchical logistic regression models used to
examine the impact of internal and external environmental factors on committee
presence. Model 1 is the base model and is not significant. Model 2 includes the main
effect variables and significantly improved the model (p < .001) indicating firm size, firm
experience, and industry stability improved the analysis of the dependent variable. Model
3 included the interaction term of firm size and industry stability and did not significantly
improve the main effects model. However, Model 4 included the interaction term of
firm experience and industry stability and significantly improved the main effects model
(p < .01). Lastly, Model 5 is the full model and is highly significant (p < .001) and
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improved the analysis of the dependent variable over the main effects model (p < .01).
The Nagelkerke R Square for the respective model is 0.256.
Results for hypotheses 1 and 2 can be found in Model 2 in Table 2. Hypotheses 1
and 2 posit a negative relationship between firm experience/resources and the
probability of strategic committee being present. In Model 2 firm experience was
negative and significant (β = -0.020, p <.001) supporting H1, but firm resources was
negative and insignificant, not supporting H2. This means that less experienced firms
are more likely to have SCs. Lastly, hypothesis 3 posits a positive relationship between
industry stability and the probability of a strategic committee. Industry stability was
negative and significant (Model 2: β = -0.342, p <.01). This means that firms in stable
industries are more likely to have SCs; thus, hypothesis 3 is supported.
Model 3 and 4 examines hypotheses 4 and 5, which stipulate a positive
relationship between the interaction term firm experience/resources and industry
stability and the probability of strategic committee presence; less experienced/less
resource abundant firms in more stable industries are more likely to have SCs. Prior to
running the interaction analysis, interactive variables were mean centered to enhance
the interpretation of the coefficients (Aiken and West, 1991). The interaction effect of
firm resources and industry stability is not significant; H5 is not supported. However,
the interaction effect of firm experience and industry stability is negative and significant
(Model 4: β = -0.006, p <.01). This means less experienced firms in more stable
industries are more likely to have SCs.
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To interpret the significant interaction, I created an interaction plot. Following
Tiwana (2008), ± 2 S.D. was used to make the visual interpretation of the interaction
more pronounced. High experience firms were defined as having a resource value two
standard deviations above the mean. Similarly, two standard deviations above or below
the mean was applied to high stability and low stability industries. To make the
interaction plot more intuitive, industry stability was rewritten as industry instability
since higher values for the industry stability measure represent greater industry

Probability of Committee Presence

instability.

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

Low Experience
High Experience

Low

High
Industry Instability

Figure 1.1. Interaction of firm experience and industry instability
Figure 1.2 shows the nature of the firm experience/industry stability interaction
on the probability of committee presence. The plot shows that as industry instability
increases, probability differences between high and low experienced firms grow. It
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appears less experienced firms in more stable industries are more likely to have SCs.
Hence, H4 is supported.
Table 1.3. Results of hierarchical OLS regression analysis a

Africa Dummy
Asia Dummy
Europe Dummy
North America Dummy
Committee Present
R2
Adjusted R

2

Change in R2
F

Model (1)
β
S.E.
0.047
0.052
0.045 *** 0.011
0.045 *** 0.010
0.002
0.008

Model (2)
β
S.E.
0.070
0.053
0.059 *** 0.011
0.061 *** 0.012
0.020 * 0.010
-0.033 ** 0.011

0.055

0.069

0.049

0.062

9.445***

0.014**
9.563***

N = 653
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
a

Non-standardized, estimated coefficient with standard error below
in parentheses.

Lastly, Table 1.3 shows the hierarchical OLS regression analysis for H6 which
proposed a positive relationship between firms with strategic committees based on the
aforementioned factors and performance. Model 1 is the base model with Model 2
being the main effects model. The change in R-squared is significant (p < .001)
indicating the predictor variable committee present enhances the analysis of the
dependent variable in Model 2 (F = 9.563, p < .001).
However, because the R-squared and adjusted R-squared in Model 2 were small,
following Shah (2000), I conducted mean difference tests. I compared the means of
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ROA between firms with and without a strategic committee. The results show that the
ROA of firms with a strategic committee ( = .007) is statistically and significantly lower
than firms without a strategic committee ( = .046) at the p < .001 level; H6 is not
supported.

CONCLUSION
This study represents an initial attempt to identify which firms may be using a
SC and explain relative firm performance for firms with and without SCs. Using a
liabilities of newness perspective that states inexperienced firms usually lack resources
and legitimacy, I hypothesized that: (1) strategic committees are more likely to be
present in firms lacking experience and resources; (2) strategic committees are more
likely to be present in firms operating in stable industries; (3) firms with less experience
operating in stable markets are more likely to have a strategic committee; and (4) based
on the aforementioned factors, firms with strategic committees on average have greater
performance than firms without strategic committees. Thus, it appears that the creation
of SCs appears to be linked to the newness of firms.
Based on the empirical results, I draw four conclusions. First, it appears that
firms with less experience are more likely to have a SC present within the organization.
Second, greater market stability increases the probability of a firm having a SC. Third,
as a firm gains more experience and the industry in which they operate becomes more
unstable, the probability of a firm having a SC decreases substantially. Lastly, firms
with less experience and resources operating in more stable markets will have better
performance compared to firms without committees.
25

I draw four managerial implications from the study. First, it appears an
inexperienced firm may be able to provide legitimacy to external stakeholders because
the committee is visible and the name „strategic committee‟ signals long-term
orientation of the company. Second, organizations operating in stable markets may
improve organizational effectiveness by creating a strategic committee to facilitate the
development of new organizational routines that focus specifically on efficiencies.
Third, a strategic committee could aid inexperienced firms establish formal structures
and processes to be more efficient in stable industries; inexperienced firms typically lack
organization and structure which creates operational inefficiencies. Lastly, it is
important for organizations to examine firm experience, resources and current market
stability to increase firm performance through the use of a strategic committee. Thus, it
appears that strategic committees are a new phenomenon to compensate for an
organizations lack of experience, resources, and/or legitimacy.
Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. First, my sample only included publicly
traded companies. Future research may wish to extend these research questions by
examining non-publicly traded or private international firms. Second, I used simple
constructs to measure profits (ROA), firm resources (number of employees), and firm
experience (firm age). Future research may wish to develop and test other measures of
firm performance and firm characteristics. Third, this research only examined
environmental factors to predict which firms may have strategic committees and did
not look at the possible reasons why firms form such committees.
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Finally, this paper raises additional research questions. For instance, why do
firms form strategic committees? What specific role do strategic committees play in
large organizations? Looking at firms with strategic committees only, what external
environmental factors influence performance the most? What committee characteristics
are most beneficial to performance? Since this is an international study, how does
culture influence these findings? Thus, this paper is research opening, raising as many
questions as it answers. Future efforts, by addressing these and other questions, will be
able to better explain the role of the strategic committee and provide better guidance to
firm managers who attempt to implement strategic committees.
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ESSAY 2 – STRATEGIC COMMITTEES AND INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS:
WHEN IS IT BENEFICIAL TO FIRM PERFORMANCE?
INTRODUCTION
Organizational strategy is responsible for selecting and interpreting environmental
factors to properly align the organization with its environment (Gordon et al., 2000; Keats and
Hitt, 1988; Zajac and Kraatz, 1993). For instance, in extremely dynamic, uncertain, or
unpredictable environments, organizations tend to exhibit flexible structures to be able to adjust
quickly and survive (D‟Aveni, 1994). Mature, stable environments, on the other hand, typically
influence organizations to develop more rigid structures focusing on efficiencies and routines
(Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day, 1982).
Recently, environmental dynamism has increased due to the rising number of international
competitors. As a consequence, organizations, both domestic and international, are developing
new organizational forms. One such organizational change is the formation of the strategic
committee (SC) within the board of directors.
Close examination of SC charters demonstrates organization concerns with the
changing environment and strategy making. For example, the 2007-2008 annual report for
Coastal Greenland states:
“The Strategic Planning Committee’s principal roles are to review and evaluate the Company’s
strategy with respect to the operating environment and the Company’s financial and other
operating resources and make recommendations to the Board when necessary and appropriate.”
People are typically familiar with the traditional committees of the board of directors
(i.e., audit, nomination, and acquisition committees to name a few) (Andriole, 2009). As such,
research has primarily focused on these types of committees. For example, accounting
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researchers have focused on audit committee effectiveness post Sarbanes Oxely (Abbott et al.,
2007; Akrak and Ussahawanitchakit, 2010). In addition, Harjoto and Hoje (2008) found a
positive relationship between nomination committees and firm performance. Lastly, studies
have examined the impact of these committees on overall corporate governance (Nowland,
2008; Surroca and Tribó, 2008) and firm performance (Bozec, 2005; Henry, 2008). However, with
the newness of the SC as a new organizational form, it is not well known and therefore
unexplored.
The purpose of this paper is to use the liabilities of newness theory to predict which
industries would best be served by the use of a strategic committee. More specifically, I
hypothesize: 1) there is a positive relationship between SC firms operating in mature

industries and firm performance; 2) there is a negative relationship between SC firms
operating in hypercompetitive industries and firm performance; and 3) there is a
positive relationship between SC firms operating in flat experience curve industries and
firm performance. These hypotheses are tested on a sample of 333 international firms
with strategic committees.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Liabilities of Newness
The liabilities of newness theoretical perspective argues younger firms are more
vulnerable because they lack legitimacy, resources, and capabilities of older, more established
organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965). Research has found that these factors have contributed to
the disproportionately high rates of failure among younger firms (Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990;
Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Moreover, four factors have been directly linked to the liabilities
of newness: 1) the need to establish organizational structures; 2) difficulty in establishing new
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relationships; 3) limited resource endowment and social network; and 4) lack of financial capital
(Carayannopoulos, 2009; Goldberg, Cohen, and Fiegenbaum, 2003; Shepherd, Douglas, and
Shanley, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965).
The first underlying component of liabilities of newness comes from the organization‟s
lack of well established tasks and routines (Beekman and Robinson, 2004; Nelson and Winter,
1982; Shepherd et al., 2000). Developing organizational routines and coordinating
organizational tasks requires high costs in time, anxiety, conflict, and short-term inefficiency
(Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Stinchcombe, 1965). Compared to older firms, younger firms
are at an operational disadvantage as they must incur costs to develop these tasks and
procedures in-house or through some form of outsourcing (Morse, Fowler, and Lawrence, 2007;
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman, 1990). As a result, young firms
are of greater likelihood to fail because high costs are incurred as critical resources must be
reallocated from operations to train employees and develop set routines (Freeman, Carroll, and
Hannan, 1983).
The second component describes the difficulty in establishing trust relationships with a
young firm. New firms must rely heavily on trusting strangers (Goldberg et al., 2003) allowing
themselves to be susceptible to opportunistic behavior (Gambetta, 1988; Lewis and Weigert,
1985). The reliance on “strangers” stems from the fact that young firms have limited market
exposure and connections (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Since young firms have limited contacts
and networks, they are prevented from connecting with other beneficial organizations and
networks (Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Uzzi, 1997). Young firms lack legitimacy (information that is
made available) with consumers making it difficult to establish trust relationships (Morse et al.,
2007).
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Third, young firms typically lack resources and social capital needed for survival. Social
capital is an element of social structure and means for assisting action within a structure
(Coleman, 1990; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). However, young firms are unable to exploit
social capital as market experience is underdeveloped (Van de Ven et al., 1989). Regarding
resources, young firms are at a disadvantage as they are typically smaller compared to older
firms. Large organizations have a greater amount of resources and therefore better able to cope
with environmental fluctuations (Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990). Young firm survival is impeded
by lack of social capital and limited resources.
Lastly, young firm survival is challenged by the lack of financial resources.
Traditionally, young firm finances are pooled from family, friends, and other strong
relationships willing to invest (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Hite and Hesterly, 2001). Older, more
established firms, however, have developed financial reserves allowing for greater financial
stability and investment flexibility (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Starr and MacMillan, 1990).
Young firms are at a financial disadvantage as they are limited in how finances may be invested
and are more susceptible to economic downswings.
The prior underlying components of the liabilities of newness describe the situations in
which younger firms are at higher risks for failure (Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990; Freeman et al.,
1983; Henderson, 1999; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986). These linkages were theorized and
tested empirically further enhancing the liabilities of newness perspective. The remainder of
this paper seeks to build on this research by exploring the relationships between SCs, industry
characteristics, and firm performance.
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Literature Review and Hypotheses

In which industries do strategic committees aid or hinder firm performance;
mature industries, hypercompetitive industries and/or steep experience curve
industries are each examined.
Strategic committees and market maturity
Mature industries are characterized as being large with stable or slowly
growing demand, dominant product designs, process technologies, and clear strategies
for success (Hambrick, MacMillan, and Day, 1982). In addition, there is less change in
competition, products, and technology (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1990).
New firms in mature industries may become profitable, but are not likely to
become large or industry leaders (Romanelli, 1987). Mature industries contain
established competitors which have greater advantages over smaller firms (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1990); established firms have greater economies of scale, market
knowledge, and experience. Hence, young firms have limited growth opportunities
because of intense competition from established competitors (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1990).
Competition varies within mature and non-mature industries. While large
profits may be obtainable in emerging industries, profits tend to deteriorate as
industries mature because competition intensifies; profits attract new entrants and
barriers to entry fail to work as more industry information becomes available as the
industry matures (Lambkin and Day, 1989). Increasing competition in more mature
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markets then causes firms to focus more on basic product design needs and
standardization (Katz, 2008).
As such, young firms in such industries need to rely on upper management to
guide the firm in improving competitiveness and further stages of development
(Kazanjian, 1988). Information in mature industries is readily available, but experience
is not; young firms lack experience creating difficulty in establishing routines,
processes, and strategies to be competitive. Moreover, competition intensity within
mature industries continually threatens firm survival. The purpose of a SC then is to
aid young firm development by using SC member experience to compensate for the
lack of organizational experience; the characteristics of industry maturity (i.e., stable
demand, dominant product designs, and clear strategies for success) allow SC
experience to transfer to the organization and be beneficial. I hypothesize:
H7: There is a positive relationship between young firms with strategic committees in
more mature industries and firm performance
Strategic committees and hypercompetiveness
Hypercompetition is the result of extreme conditions of industry dynamism
(D‟Aveni, 1994). Typically, hypercompetition is associated with new technologies and
new industries as firms try to exploit new value in industries with great uncertainty and
volatility. In addition, consumers are unfamiliar with company product/service
offerings creating low demand (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984). Within
hypercompetitive industries, all forms of competitive advantage are often short-lived
(D‟ Aveni, 1994) as new innovations are continuously created. Waves of innovation
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stimulate the birth of emergent markets (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) but give
way to market maturity and stability as innovation weakens (Anderson and Zeithaml,
1984).
Young firms, however, typically are constrained by limited resources, skills and
physical plant limiting the firm‟s ability to ride out the emergent and/or growth period
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Younger firms face liabilities of newness as older
firms have perfected the routines, structures, and infrastructure that are needed for
continuous innovation (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). Routines allow an organization to
obtain knowledge and develop efficiencies to be more productive and enhance
survivability, but it is dependent on external environmental stability (Bercovitz and
Mitchell, 2007); hypercompetitive markets create ongoing change limiting the ability of
the young firms to develop routines and enhance the firm‟s knowledge pool.
Established firms have accumulated more knowledge over time creating greater
internal efficiencies (Levinthal, 1991; Klepper, 1996). As Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
note, an established knowledge base is crucial to the innovative process as it helps
assimilate new ideas more efficiently. Hence, firms with a well established knowledge
base are able to create ideas more efficiently allowing the firm to pursue innovative
opportunities that continue to add knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
In order to achieve high performance in dynamic or stable markets,
organizations need efficiency and flexibility (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009;
Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007). In hypercompetitive environments, it becomes increasing
difficult to continually align the organization with the external environment; firm
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competencies that create efficiencies are short-lived as the environment changes forcing
the organization to continually develop new competencies and new efficiencies
(Sørensen and Stuart, 2000). Flexible business models are needed in industries of rapid
technological change (i.e., hypercompetitive industries) to maintain high levels of
performance (Andries and Debackere, 2007). Young firms may have advantages of
flexibility in highly dynamic environments (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001; Wiklund and
Shepherd, 2005), but they often lack key organizational efficiencies. As a result, new
firms never really pursue a growth strategy or any stunning level of profitability as they
are unable to exploit any given idea to its full potential because they are limited by their
inability to scale-up effectively and efficiently (Steffens, Davidsson, and Fitzsimmons,
2009).
The use of a strategic committee may seem beneficial in industries of high
volatility, but it may be counterproductive. While new environments play a crucial role
in the opportunities for new firms (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982), it often takes a large
firm to establish some industry standards (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) because of
their acquired knowledge base and operational effectiveness and efficiency. I have
argued in the first paper of this dissertation that young firms form a strategic committee
to have access to a greater knowledge base to improve organizational effectiveness and
efficiency. However, the degree of uncertainty and volatility in hypercompetitive
markets is so great that it cannot simply be overcome by pooling the knowledge of
experienced board members. Operational effectiveness and efficiency has to be
institutionalized in organization operations to create a knowledge base for the firm to
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continually exploit new ideas and opportunities. This cannot be simply transferred
from SC members to the organization, it has to be acquired for the firm to be a good
performer. As such, I hypothesize:
H8: Young firms with strategic committees in hypercompetitive industries will
underperform compared to firms with strategic committees in other industries
Strategic committees and experience curve effects
Older organizations have become more effective with age (Levinthal, 1991;
Nelson and Winter, 1982) because they have accumulated production experience,
possess stronger relationships with vendors and customers, and have a more
experienced workforce (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover,
experience with set routines improves reliability in which routines are implemented
(March, 1991) allowing firms to accumulate knowledge to further innovation (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). Older firms are able to move down the experience curve because
they have accumulated „foundational knowledge‟ improving organizational
competence (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000).
Young firms, on the other hand, have a high degree of the liability of newness
because they start at the beginning of the learning curve (Pennings, Barkema, and
Douma, 1994). These firms face significant disadvantages because they typically lack
managerial expertise, access to capital, and bargaining power with suppliers and buyers
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Walske and Zacharakis, 2009); newer firms may have lower
quality and higher costs because they lack firm-specific resources and know-how that
older firms possess (Geroski and Walters, 1995).
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Company age is thought to be associated with higher performance due to these
experience curve effects (Schlevogt, 2001; Stinchcombe, 1965). Argote, Beckman and
Epple (1990) found that learning is acquired through experience in production, but does
not persist over a long period of time as knowledge quickly depreciates. Put
differently, in order to maintain high levels of performance in steep experience curve
industries, the firm needs to learn continually.
When discussing the implication of SCs, a distinction needs to be made between
learning by doing and learning from the experiences of others. Within steep experience
curve industries, tacit knowledge is created and embedded within the organization
(Nonaka, 1994) as it is developed through on-the-job learning and training (Simon,
2005; Williamson, 1979). Within flat experience curve industries, firms may benefit
from the experience of others as late entry still provides opportunities to learn
(Lévesque, Minniti, and Shepherd 2009). The key distinction is the exploitation of tacit
knowledge: tacit knowledge is not easily transferable and firms in steep experience
industries rely on this tacit knowledge to reduce costs and improve quality (Simon,
2005).
Therefore, tacit knowledge is not easily transferable and the use of a strategic
committee in a steep experience curve industry may have negative consequences.
Learning is well organized and systematic in established companies as they are further
down the experience curve (Andries and Debackere, 2007; Morris, Altman, and Pitt,
1999); firms will always require some cognitive effort toward strategic initiatives, but
routines and experience help guide the firm automatically (March and Simon, 1958;
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Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Simply stated, experienced firms consider fewer
strategies as current routines dictate which strategies will be most effective (Barkema
and Schijven, 2008; Levinthal and March, 1981). Learning theorists argue that firm
advantages increase as a firm accumulates more experience, so steep experience curves
require more experience to improve performance. A SC is not adding to the experience
of the firm as steep experience curves require established processes and routines over
time; the experience possessed by SC members is not necessarily tacit knowledge
specific to that organization and lessens the impact of SC member involvement on firm
performance. Based on the above reasoning, I hypothesize:
H9: There is a positive relationship between young firms with strategic committees
operating in flat experience curve industries and performance.

METHODOLOGY
Sample

Data for this study came from Capital IQ, a division of Standard & Poor‟s; it
comprised a sample of international firms with strategic committees. To be included in
the sample, firms needed to be listed publically in any world stock exchange and
currently have a strategic committee. A firm‟s 10-K, 8-K, Proxy Statements, and Annual
Glossy Reports from the Capital IQ database (2004-2008) were used to identify if a firm
had a strategic committee by searching for the terms “strategy committee”, “strategic
committee”, “business development committee”, and/or “strategy”. Firms were coded
as having a strategic committee if they had an established strategic committee in the
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time frame provided, 2004-2008, the most recent time frame available. A final sample
consisted of 333 international firms across ten industries.
Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for the current study is firm performance. Following
prior literature, Return on Assets (ROA) (Kalyta, 2009; McDonald and Westphal, 2010)
was used for firm profitability. ROA was calculated as net income divided by total
assets. Consistent with prior literature (Harris and Ruefli, 2000; Rutherford, Buchholtz,
and Brown, 2007), five-year averages of ROA (2004-2008) were used to smooth annual
fluctuations in accounting data.
Explanatory Variables

Three predictor variables are used in this study. First, a firm maturity dummy
variable was used to measure industry maturity; a value of „1‟ for mature industries and
a value of „0‟ otherwise. Firm maturity was calculated as the average change in ROA
for years (-5 to -4), (-4 to -3), (-3 to -2), (-2 to -1), and (-1 to 0). If the average change is
negative then the firm was coded „1‟ for mature, else „0‟ for non-mature firms indicated
by a positive average change in ROA (Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Liao and Chen,
2009).
Second, hypercompetiveness is measured as the research and development (R&D)
intensity of firms (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), calculated as R&D expenditures divided
by sales. R&D intensity is an indication of a firm‟s innovation level and continuous
search for new ideas (Rajagopalan and Datfa, 1996). Higher levels of R&D intensity
indicate greater levels of hypercompetition.
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Third, experience curve effects were measured by the capital intensity of firms
(Spanos, Zaralis, and Lioukas, 2004), calculated as capital expenditures divided by sales.
Steep experience curve industries reap the benefits of economies of scale from longterm asset investment, which leads to continuous resource deployments and
competitive performance (Dess and Beard, 1984; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007).
Greater levels in capital intensity represent steeper experience curves.
Control Variables

Six control variables were selected that may influence the decision to establish a
strategic committee. The first five controls look at geographic region influences and
firm performance. In a given industry, a number of country factors may influence
performance; the level of industry competition may vary by home country
characteristics. In addition, the firm‟s home market may be significantly larger than
others. These factors might influence the competitiveness of the firm and create
unobserved home market heterogeneity (Rangan and Sengul, 2009). A summary
analysis of the data revealed that firms with strategic committees were concentrated in
five geographic regions. To account for these home country specific factors in a
regional setting (unobserved heterogeneity), five geographic region dummies in the
regression analyses were included.
Second, firm size is an important control variable because firm behaviors may
depend on resource availability (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 1991). To
measure firm size, the log of number of firm employees was used (Barkema and
Shvyrkov, 2007; West and Noel, 2009).
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ANALYSIS
To examine the relationships among the predictor and dependent variables a
hierarchical OLS regression was used. Prior to running the analyses I examined the
correlations between variables. Table 2.1 shows substantial variability in the variables.
In addition to the correlation table, skewness and kurtosis analyses were done for each
measurement item; results indicate that average ROA, R&D intensity, and capital
intensity variables had high values at the third and fourth moments around the mean
(skewness and kurtosis, respectively). To correct left skewed, or negative, average ROA
data, data were first subtracted from the highest value plus one, then inversed. For
R&D and capital intensity, data were transformed by calculating the square root of the
measurement variable (Cohen et al., 2003). After completing the transformations, the
normality assumption of regression was restored.
Table 2.1. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all study variables.

Variable
1. AROA
2. Firm Maturity
3. R&D Intensity
4. Capital Intensity
5. Africa Dummy
6. Asia Dummy
7. Europe Dummy
8. LA Dummy
9. Firm Size
*** p < .001; * p < .05

Mean
S.D.
0.0081 0.1860
0.5900 0.4920
0.3827 1.8951
0.1366 0.5717
0.0150 0.1218
0.2222 0.4164
0.2673 0.4432
0.0180 0.1332
27479.6800 129062.7820

1
2
1
-0.033
1
-0.535 *** -0.047
-0.212 *** 0.007
0.028 0.001
0.131 * 0.015
0.092 -0.068
0.032 0.066
0.063 0.057
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3

4

1
0.340 *** 1
-0.005 -0.014
-0.082 -0.007
-0.080 -0.005
-0.012 -0.009
-0.065 -0.024

5

1
-0.066
-0.075
-0.017
-0.024

6

7

1
-0.323 *** 1
-0.072 -0.082
0.000 0.048

8

9

1
0.014

1

Table 2.2 displays five sets of hierarchical OLS regression models used to
examine the impact of industry level variables and the performance of firms with
strategic committees. Model 1 is the base model and is significant (F = 11.598, p < .001).
Model 2 includes the main effect variable firm maturity. While the model is significant
(F = 9.757, p < .001), it did not significantly improve the analysis of the dependent
variable (change in R squared was not significant). Model 3 includes the main effect
variable R&D intensity and significantly improved the analysis of the dependent
variable (F = 21.575, p < .001; R square change = 0.307, p < .001). Model 4 includes the
main effect variable capital intensity and similarly to Model 3 significantly improved the
analysis of the dependent variable (F = 12.689, p < .001; R square change = 0.039, p <
.001). Model 5 is the full model and significantly improved the analysis of the
dependent variable (F = 16.358, p < .001; R square change = 0.313, p < .001).
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Table 2.2. Hierarchical OLS regression analysis: firm performance a

Model (1)
β
S.E.
Control Variables
Africa Dummy
Asia Dummy
Europe Dummy
LA Dummy
Firm Size

0.035
0.027
0.008
0.010
0.010

0.029
0.009 **
0.009
0.027
0.002 ***

Independent Variables
Firm Maturity
R&D Intensity
Capital Intensity
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R
F
N

Model (2)
β
S.E.
0.035
0.027
0.007
0.011
0.010

0.029
0.009 **
0.009
0.027
0.002 ***

-0.006

0.007

Model (3)
β
S.E.
-0.022
0.008
0.001
0.043
0.006 **

0.057
0.013
0.011
0.058
0.002

Model (4)
β
S.E.
0.034
0.030 ***
0.011
0.013
0.009 ***

0.028
0.009
0.009
0.026
0.002

Model (5)
β
S.E.
-0.017
0.009
0.001
0.048
0.006 **

0.058
0.013
0.012
0.058
0.002

-0.054 *** 0.014

-0.012 0.009
-0.083 *** 0.011
0.006 0.026

-0.081 *** 0.010

0.151

0.152

0.458

0.190

0.464

0.138

0.137

0.437

0.175

0.436

11.598***
333

0.001
9.757***
333

.307***
21.575***
160

0.039***
12.689***
332

.313***
16.358***
160

2

*** p < .001; ** p < .01
a

β, unstandardized regression coefficients; S.E., standard error of the coefficients

Results for the hypotheses can be found in Table 2.2. Hypothesis 7 predicts a
positive relationship between industry maturity and average firm performance. In
Model 2, firm maturity was not significant, not supporting H1. Hypothesis 8 posits a
negative relationship between industry hypercompetiveness and firm performance. In
Model 3, R&D intensity was negative and significant (β = -0.081, p <.001), supporting
H2; this indicates that as R&D intensity increases within firms with strategic
committees, performance on average will decrease. Hypothesis 9 posits a positive
relationship between flat experience curve industries and firm performance. Model 4
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shows that capital intensity is negative and significant (β = -0.054, p <.001) indicating
performance will decrease in firms with strategic committees as capital intensity
increases; thus H9 is supported.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study represents an initial attempt to examine the relationship between
industry factors and performance of firms using strategic committees. Using a liability
of newness perspective that suggests young firms face greater difficulties because they
lack resources, experience, and legitimacy. I proposed that young firms could use a SC
to reduce these liabilities and improve firm performance in three types of industries:
mature, non-hypercompetitive, and flat experience curve. I hypothesized that: (1) there
is a positive relationship between young firms with strategic committees in more
mature industries and performance; (2) there is a negative relationship between young
firms with strategic committees in hypercompetitive industries and performance; and
(3) a positive relationship between young firms with strategic committees in flat
experience curve industries and performance.
Three conclusions can be drawn based on the empirical results. First, the results
do not indicate a positive or negative relationship between firms with SCs and industry
maturity; these results do not indicate if it is beneficial to have a SC in more mature
industries. Secondly, it appears that firms with a SC in more hypercompetitive
industries will have lower performance. Lastly, firms with a SC in steep experience
curve industries will also have lower performance. Thus I conclude that, based on my
finding that having a SC in hypercompetitive and steep experience curve industries has
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an inverse relationship with performance; a SC is non-beneficial in certain industries
and reduces performance levels with increased hypercompetition and experience
curves.
Two managerial implications are derived from the study. First,
hypercompetitive industries require more information processing to continually
innovate, but constant innovation comes from established routines and processes. In
order to reap the benefits of a strategic committee, it would be more prudent to
establish a SC in industries with less dynamism, or non-hypercompetitive industries.
Second, flat experience curve industries tend to be more stable with intense
competition. It is speculated here that the strategic committee is more beneficial in
these circumstances because markets are saturated and new strategies need to be
continually created to maintain firm competitiveness.
Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. First, the sample only included publicly
traded companies. Future research may wish to extend these research questions by
examining non-publicly traded or private international firms. Second, relatively simple
constructs measured profits (ROA), firm maturity (average change in ROA),
hypercompetitiveness (R&D intensity) and experience curve effects (capital intensity).
Future research may wish to develop and test other measures of firm performance and
firm characteristics. Third, firm maturity was not significant, so future research may
wish to explore other measurements of firm maturity and industry maturity to examine
their impact on the relationship between strategic committees and performance.
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Finally, this paper raises additional research questions. For instance, in what
contexts will strategic committees be beneficial in hypercompetitive industries? What
are the performance differences between small and large firms within nonhypercompetitive and flat experience curve industries? Are there firms that benefit
from the use of a strategic committee in hypercompetitive or steep experience curve
industries? Thus, this paper is research opening, raising as many questions as it
answers. Future efforts, by addressing these and other questions, will be able to better
explain the role of the strategic committee and provide better guidance to firm
managers who attempt to implement strategic committees.
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ESSAY 3 – STRATEGIC COMMITTEE MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS AND
FIRM PERFORMANCE
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary goals of strategic management is to improve organizational
performance (Schendel and Hofer, 1979; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Lumpkin
and Dess, 1995). The field of strategic management is comprised of four key
components and their interactions: environmental factors influencing decision making;
strategic content of the decision itself; the who and how of the decision-making process;
and the outcomes/performance of those decisions (Blair and Boal, 1991). Focusing on
the who and how of decision making, the upper echelons perspective put forth by
Hambrick and Mason (1984) offers a research base to examine top managers and their
impact on organizational outcomes (Thomas, Litschert, and Ramaswamy, 1991).
Traditionally, strategy has been used to align organization resources with the external
environment to better meet goals and objectives (Andrews, 1971). However, in today‟s
dynamic environment, it is becoming increasingly difficult to continually align the
organization with the ever changing environment (Child and McGrath, 2001).
Large organizations in particular tend to have more difficulty with this
realignment. As a firm grows, more employees are hired increasing the gap between
top managers and organizational members. To fill the gap, additional management
levels are created causing the strategy making process to decentralize and change; as
the needs of strategy changes, it causes the organizational structure to change as well
(Harris and Ruefli, 2000). Formalized approaches to planning and resource allocation
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are frequently created in order to coordinate the increased number of firm actions (Hart
and Banbury, 1994). Hence, strategic committees may be formed to coordinate these
actions.
Strategic committees may offer additional explanation of organizational
outcomes. Using upper echelons to focus on executive groups tends to explain
organization outcomes better than by solely focusing on CEOs or individual leaders
(Hambrick, 2007). As Daft and Lewin (1993) note, researchers can have a greater impact
by focusing on midrange phenomena. Moreover, research may benefit by focusing on
„subteams‟ (Hambrick, 2007), one such group may be strategic committees.
The research question asked here is: What are the moderating variables of
strategic committees that may improve organizational performance? More specifically,
will strategic committees with greater tenure heterogeneity outperform other firms with
strategic committees? Will the amount of education heterogeneity have a greater impact
on performance than less education heterogeneity? And lastly, will longer committee
tenure (i.e., how long the organization has had a committee) have a positive impact on
performance? Using Hambrick and Mason‟s (1984) upper echelons theory as my
theoretical prism, I attempt to answer these questions drawing upon a sample of 208
large international firms with strategic committees.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The upper echelons perspective put forth by Hambrick and Mason (1984)
postulates that top management team (TMT) demographic characteristics influence
TMT‟s cognitive structure and thereby influences organizational outcomes. Empirical
48

research has supported this claim by demonstrating that TMT member age (Datta and
Rajagopalan, 1998; Tihany et al., 2000), tenure (Bergh, 2001; Herrmann and Datta, 2005),
education (Jensen and Zajac, 2004), and heterogeneity (Lee and Park, 2006) influence the
strategic posture of firms (Patzelt, zu Knyphausen-Aufse, and Nikil, 2008).
Strategic decision making may be influenced by the age of the TMT member
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Younger managers are more likely to search for
additional information when making decisions, evaluate information more precisely
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Taylor, 1975), seek participative management structures
(Hitt and Tyler, 1991), and have better tools for decision making (Bantel and Jackson,
1989). Older managers tend to exhibit lower physical and mental stamina (Child, 1974),
less ability to seize new ideas and learn new behaviors (Chown, 1960), and a loss in
cognitive ability (Burke and Light, 1981; Greening and Johnson, 1996). Moreover,
research has found that with increased age comes a decrease in flexibility and increased
rigidity (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). It appears then strategic decisions may be more
flexible and innovative from younger team members and more rigid and static with
older team members.
Research has also examined how a team member‟s tenure influences strategic
decisions. Longer tenure allows for the development of information sources,
relationships, and problem-solving routines (Katz, 1982); it also contributes to an
executive‟s knowledge base, perspective, and insights of the organization (Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1990; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Longer tenure results in greater
TMT organization experience and understanding of a shared language created from
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how organizational members interpret, understand, and respond to information (Allen
and Cohen, 1969; Wiersema and Bird, 1993).
Conversely, longer tenure also has been found to be positively related to a
reliance on standard procedures and customs (Katz, 1982) creating common standards
and expectations of current organizational practices (Salancik, 1977); long tenured
executives become satisfied with the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and
Fredrickson, 1993). This is likely to create a restricted perspective and a limited
knowledge base, among long tenured executives, in which to examine the best strategic
options (Cyert and March, 1963), potentially resulting in a type of organizational
rigidity.
Strategic decisions may also be influenced by an executive‟s educational
background. Education represents a manager‟s knowledge and skill base. Hambrick
and Mason (1984) argued that the formal education level acquired by an executive was
positively related to innovation. It was hypothesized that managers with greater
education are prone to select more innovative strategies. Furthermore, increased
education levels cause the experiences and mindset of the manager to become more
complete and well rounded (Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993). Cognitive models are
therefore influenced by an executive‟s education level which in turn may influence
strategic decisions (Hitt and Tyler, 1991).
Lastly, heterogeneity is usually a combination of the observable characteristics of
age, tenure, and education that represent executive psychological attributes that
influence strategic choices and firm performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984;
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Zimmerman, 2008). Research has found a positive relationship between heterogeneous
groups and firm performance (Kilduff, Angelmar, and Mehra, 2000); heterogeneity
provides groups with a wide range in perspectives, experience, and knowledge creating
improved strategies and performance.
The literature stated above shows some of the key components between
committee characteristics and firm performance. These linkages were theorized and
tested empirically further enhancing the upper echelons theoretical base. The
remainder of this paper seeks to build upon upper echelons theory as well by
examining SC member characteristics influence on firm performance.

THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

Strategic Committee Tenure Heterogeneity

Tenure (i.e., time spent within the organization) is typically a gauge for a
manager‟s capacity to collect and analyze information (Miller, 1991). Longer tenured
executives are more likely to be committed to established policies, procedures and
history (Katz, 1982), prior strategies (Hambrick et al., 1993), and strategic persistence
(Bergh, 2001; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Shorter tenured executives typically
experiment more (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991), have better sources of information
(Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987), more willing to change organization strategies and
configurations (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and pursue more innovative strategies
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Bergh, 2001); less tenured executives are new to company
policies, norms, and values and are thus less restricted (Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996).
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A top management team with greater tenure homogeneity (members with same
levels of organization experience) may become entrenched and less open to change
while greater tenure heterogeneity (members with varying levels of organization
experience, both new and old) leads to increased communication difficulty, but wider
range of information knowledge and perspectives (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).
Homogeneity among top management team members‟ tenure creates a common
vocabulary (Rhodes, 1983), a similar interpretation of events (Allen and Cohen, 1969),
and enhanced communication among group members (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989)
producing consistent and customized communication channels enhancing team
cohesiveness and integration (Katz, 1982; O‟Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989;
Wiersema and Bird, 1993). More tenured organizational members have greater
experience and share similarities in how members infer, recognize, and react to
information (Wiersema and Bird, 1993). Organizational members with comparable
tenures typically share past decision-making and experiences causing entrenchment to
occur.
Tenure heterogeneity, however, implies team members have different experience
levels and cognitive perspectives within the organization (Wiersema and Bird, 1993).
While greater tenure heterogeneity often leads to difficulties in communication
(McCain, O‟Reilly, and Pfeffer, 1983) and discrepancies in attitudes, values, and beliefs
(Pfeffer, 1983), diversity leads to less entrenchment and more effective strategic
decisions as a wide range in tenure leads to more scrutiny, criticism, and questioning of
underlying assumptions of strategies (Greening and Johnson, 1996).
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Based on the empirical results of prior theoretical findings, I suggest that
strategic committees with greater tenure heterogeneity are more effective. Increased
organizational tenure causes executives to develop set habits, establish routine
information sources and rely more on past experience (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996);
greater tenure leads to firm and industry experience that builds a firm‟s knowledge and
practice (Penrose, 1959). However, generation and evaluation of information becomes
narrower as tenure increases (Herrmann and Datta, 2005). Therefore, strategic
committees need tenure heterogeneity to avoid entrenchment and low information
processing, but continue to use acquired information through tenure. Thus:
H10: Large firms with greater strategic committee tenure heterogeneity outperform large
firms with less strategic committee tenure heterogeneity.
Strategic Committee Education Heterogeneity
Executive decisions are affected by the knowledge and skill base acquired
through executive educational background (Johnson et al., 1993). Education provides
individuals with the opportunity to improve one‟s understanding of what they know,
better predict outcomes, manage time and resources better, and monitor results more
effectively (Smith, Collins, and Clark, 2005). In addition, higher education may also
indicate a broader educational base as an executive may have a Bachelors of Science
degree in engineering and a Masters in Business (Johnson et al., 1993). The benefit of
higher education allows managers to process more complex information and detect
patterns in information leading to quicker strategic decisions (Patzelt, zu KnyphausenAufse, and Nikol, 2008; Wally and Baum, 1994).
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Strategic decisions and cognitive models are also affected by the knowledge base
created from education (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hitt and Tyler, 1991). It has been
proposed that as one‟s education level increases, cognitive models and strategic
decisions become more complete (Hitt and Tyler, 1991).
Moreover, education has been linked to a team‟s information-processing capacity
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989). According to Bantel (1993), teams with greater educational
heterogeneity (e.g., variety of education held by members, not quantity) will have a
wider viewpoint towards decisions. Moreover, greater heterogeneity leads to more
competitive responses and action (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996), strategic clarity
(Bantel, 1993), strategic adaptation (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and firm performance
in established firms (Hambrick et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1994; Zimmerman, 2008). An
organization may be better prepared to analyze a wider variety of problems with
greater education heterogeneity (Tihany et al., 2000; Zimmerman 2008).
Higher levels of education are correlated with a team‟s ability to create and
institutionalize innovative solutions to difficult problems (Bantel and Jackson, 1989;
Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). Educational heterogeneity creates diversity in team
perspectives aiding problem-solving activities through new and innovative ideas
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Specifically, educational backgrounds affect a person‟s
cognitive model (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984); a manager with a
degree in engineering will access and process information differently than a manager
with a degree in law frequently leading to different strategic choices and decisions.
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Therefore, large firms may stabilize firm performance through greater education
heterogeneity in strategic committees. First, a wider knowledge base creates a bigger
cognitive perspective in which to base strategic decisions on. Second, greater
heterogeneity leads to faster information processing of complex problems allowing the
strategic committee to formulate strategic responses. Third, strategic committees with
greater heterogeneity may be better prepared for a wider variety of problems. Lastly,
SC heterogeneity ensures innovative ideas are continuously brought forward as varying
backgrounds create different perspectives and solutions. As such, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 11: Strategic committees in large firms with greater educational
heterogeneity will on average have greater performance stability than strategic
committees with less educational heterogeneity.
Strategic Committee Age and Large Firm Performance
Prior upper echelons literature has primarily focused on the top management
team, top executives, and/or board of directors (Carpenter, 2000; Higgins and Gulati,
2006; Kor and Misangyi, 2008), but research appears to be limited on committee or team
tenure (e.g., age of the committee, not its members). In the accounting literature, studies
have examined voluntary audit committee formation (Sharma, Naiker, and Lee, 2009;
Willekens, Vander, and Gaeremynck, 2004) along with other forms of corporate
governance committees (Klein, 2003; Talha, Salim, and Masoud, 2009). Management
research has found that team cohesiveness is improved with longer team tenure leading
to better performance and group performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990;
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). However, research on the team title and longevity
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appears to have been overlooked. Building on the upper echelons perspective, how
does the same logic used for the prior two hypotheses apply to the age of the strategic
committee? Or stated simply, how does the length of time a firm has had a strategic
committee affect firm performance?
Zellmer-Bruhn and Gibson (2006) suggest: 1) older teams may be more
committed to current routines and therefore less likely to change; or 2) have developed
specific routines over time resulting in greater effectiveness.
Longer tenure and negative performance
Hambrick and Mason (1984) hypothesized a negative relationship between the
average age of the upper echelon and firm growth due to conservatism and biasness in
older executives trying to maintain the status quo. Older executives succumb to the
inertia that is created as team experience mounts (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991;
Miller, 1991); longer tenure equals greater commitment to established policies,
procedures, and history (Katz, 1982), prior strategies (Hambrick et al., 1993), and
strategic persistence (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990).
Longer tenure may be associated with decreased firm awareness and persistence
in current strategies that lead to organizational problems (Greening and Johnson, 1996).
Longer tenure leads to entrenchment in the status quo (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and
difficulty in creating alternative strategies as long-term acculturation generates a
universal, internally-shared perspective (Pfeffer, 1983). Katz (1982) suggests that
longer-tenure in a firm increases rigidity and commitment to standardized practices.
Thus, as the strategic committee ages, it becomes a standardized process that becomes
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entrenched within the organization increasing firm rigidity and decreasing firm
performance. I hypothesize:
H12a: The tenure of strategic committees is negatively related to firm performance
Longer tenure and positive performance
Conversely, as mentioned earlier prior research has also positively linked team
tenure to organizational performance (Hambrick and D‟Aveni, 1992; Michel and
Hambrick, 1992). Theoretically, Pfeffer (1993) posited that performance will be greater
as team members learn organizational practices and procedures. Moreover, Katz (1982)
suggests team tenure leads to increased team stability and goal alignment further
enhancing team dynamics and reducing bureaucratic barriers (Eisenhardt, 1989). As
such, team decision making becomes readily accessible and predictable allowing
management to distribute strategies more quickly.
Longer tenure may be associated with increased team dynamics and
cohesiveness leading to improved firm performance. Longer tenure represents
familiarity with organizational operations allowing for consistency in decision-making.
Moreover, organizational members can infer what strategic decisions will be selected
allowing for quicker implementation of strategies. Hence, as the strategic committee
ages, it becomes part of the organizational strategic process creating stability and
enhancing goal achievement. Thus:
H12b: The tenure of strategic committees is positively related to firm performance

57

METHODOLOGY
Sample

Data for this study came from Capital IQ, a division of Standard & Poor‟s; it
comprised a sample of large international firms with strategic committees. To be
included in the sample, firms needed to be listed publically in any world stock
exchange and currently have a strategic committee. A firm‟s 10-K, 8-K, Proxy
Statements, and Annual Glossy Reports from the Capital IQ database (2004-2008) were
used to identify if a firm had a strategic committee by searching for the terms “strategy
committee”, “strategic committee”, “business development committee”, and/or
“strategy”. Firms were coded as having a strategic committee if they had an established
strategic committee in the time frame provided, 2004-2008, the most recent time frame
available. Lastly, firms were considered to be large if they had 1000 or more employees
(Bartels et al., 1998; Cornelius, Wallace, and Tassabehji, 2007). A final sample consisted
of 208 large international firms across ten industries.
Dependent Variables

Firm profitability and profit stability variables are used to create two sets of
dependent variables. Following prior top management team research, Return on Assets
(ROA) (Hambrick and Cannella, 2004; Marcel, 2009) was used to measure firm
profitability, calculated as net income divided by total assets. Consistent with prior
literature (Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown, 2007), five-year averages of ROA (20042008) were used to smooth annual fluctuations in accounting data.
The second set of dependent variables used in this study attempt to capture
profit stability. Following Palich, Carini, and Seaman (2000), the standard deviation of
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ROA from 2004-2008 was used to measure profit stability; firms with higher standard
deviations for ROA have less stable profits than firms with lower standard deviations.
Explanatory Variables

Two types of strategic committee member heterogeneity were examined:
educational heterogeneity and company tenure heterogeneity. Educational heterogeneity
examines the diversity in educational backgrounds of strategic committee members.
Company tenure heterogeneity studies the amount of time strategic committee members
have spent with the organization. Both of these heterogeneity measures have been used
in prior studies (Carpenter, 2002; Luo and Chung, 2005) reflecting diversity on different
dimensions (Hambrick et al., 1996). Examining two different levels of diversity, offers a
slightly broader perspective on the effects of SC heterogeneity on a firm‟s competitive
behavior. Company tenure heterogeneity was calculated as the standard deviation of the
number of years the members of the strategic committee had spent in the firm
(Hambrick et al., 1996). Committee education heterogeneity was measured using a variation
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),

where H is the heterogeneity measure and p is the percentage of strategic committee
members in each of the eight educational categories listed in the Appendix. Those with
graduate degrees were coded using the corresponding graduate disciplines; those
without graduate degrees, were coded using undergraduate disciplines. Coding
members‟ educational background was straightforward for almost all cases. However,
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for those few cases that could not be coded easily (i.e., multiple graduate or
undergraduate degrees and/or degree attained but not listed), the most recent degree
that was listed was used. Then the HHI was calculated for educational background
heterogeneity (Hambrick et al., 1996).
The third and final predictor variable is committee organization tenure; how long
the organization has had a strategic committee. Performance could be affected
negatively or positively depending upon how long the organization has used a strategic
committee. Put differently, has the committee had ample time to navigate organization
bureaucracies and understand organizational functions? To capture committee
organization tenure, a search was done for the first mentioning of the aforementioned
terms in the proxy statements. However, since this sample included international firms
that may not be required to provide proxy statements, the search was broadened by
examining annual reports, glossy annual reports, and press releases. Once the date of
the first mentioning of the searched term was located, that date was subtracted from
2008 to get strategic committee age.
Control Variables

Two sets of control variables were selected for the current study. The first set of
controls look at industry influences and firm performance. In a given industry, a
number of factors may influence performance; the level of industry competition may
vary based on the industry. These factors might influence the competitiveness of the
firm and create unobserved industry heterogeneity (Dess, Ireland and Hitt, 1990). For
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that reason, ten industry dummy variables classified by Capital IQ were used to control
for specific influences (Dess et al., 1990; McGuire and Dow, 2003).
The second set of control variables looks at firm characteristics. First, firm size is
an important control variable because firm behaviors may depend on resource
availability (Hambrick et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1991). To measure firm size, the log of
number of firm employees was used (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; West and Noel,
2009). Firm age is the second firm level control variable. Age may be used as an
indicator of firm experience dealing with industry competition (Boyd and Bresser, 2008;
Shamsie et al., 2004). Firm age is calculated here as 2008 minus firm inception.
ANALYSIS

To examine relationships among the predictor and dependent variables two sets
of hierarchical OLS regression were used. Prior to running the regressions correlations
between variables were examined. Table 3.1 shows substantial variability in the
variables. Bivariate correlations among dependent variables (ROA and ROA S.D.) were
high, which is expected since these dependent variables measure the same construct
(performance). Since these dependent variables never appear in the same equation, the
high correlations did not create multicollinearity problems. In addition to the
correlation table, skewness and kurtosis analyses were done; the results indicate the
data met the normality assumptions.
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Table 3.1. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all study variables
Table 6. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all study variables
Variable
Mean
S.D.
1
2
1. ROA
0.0512 0.0791
1
2. SDROA
0.0443 0.0798
-0.535 *** 1
3. Company Tenure Heterogeneity 5.4719 4.4811
0.140 * -0.082
4. Committee Education Heterogeneity 0.5685 0.1988
-0.076 -0.147
5. Committee Org Tenure
4.6938 3.2599
-0.017 -0.075
6. Consumer Discretionary
0.1737 0.3798
-0.120 0.155 *
7. Consumer Staples
0.0704 0.2565
0.086 -0.007
8. Energy
0.0376 0.1906
0.062 -0.047
9. Financials
0.0845 0.2788
-0.029 -0.104
10. Healthcare
0.0986 0.2988
-0.058 0.026
11. Industrials
0.1925 0.3952
-0.015 -0.112
12. Information Technology
0.1737 0.3798
0.028 0.066
13. Materials
0.0986 0.2988
0.078 0.037
14. Telecommunication Services
0.0423 0.2016
0.078 -0.039
15. Firm Size
42770.2100 159480.1160 0.042 -0.072
16. Firm Age
56.5400 44.8030
0.012 -0.059
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

3

1
0.044
0.155 *
0.022
0.096
-0.065
-0.031
0.005
0.057
-0.069
-0.020
0.009
0.221 ***
0.061

4

1
0.073
-0.042
-0.006
-0.011
-0.025
-0.024
0.066
-0.069
0.024
0.082
-0.014
0.004

5

6

1
-0.029
0.025
0.072
-0.045
0.051
0.039
-0.103
0.071
-0.016
0.151 *
0.307 ***

1
-0.126
-0.091
-0.139 *
-0.152 *
-0.224 ***
-0.210 **
-0.152 *
-0.096
-0.062
0.081

7

1
-0.054
-0.084
-0.091
-0.134
-0.126
-0.091
-0.058
0.235 ***
0.006

8

9

10

1
-0.060
-0.065
-0.096
-0.091
-0.065
-0.041
0.098
-0.081

1
-0.100
-0.148 *
-0.139 *
-0.100
-0.064
-0.053
0.093

1
-0.161 *
-0.152 *
-0.109
-0.069
-0.069
0.068

11

1
-0.224 ***
-0.161 *
-0.103
0.025
0.027

12

1
-0.152 *
-0.096
-0.094
-0.243 ***

13

14

15

16

1
-0.069
-0.007
0.106

1
0.021
-0.129

1
0.035

1

Table 3.2 displays four sets of hierarchical OLS regression models used to
examine the relationship between strategic committee member characteristics and firm
performance. Model 1 is the base model and is not significant. Model 2 includes the
main effect variable company tenure heterogeneity. The model is significant (F = 1.670, p <
.10) and significantly improved the analysis of the dependent variable (R-square change
= 0.023, p < .05). However, the low adjusted R-square of .034 for this model suggests
that company tenure heterogeneity alone does not adequately explain average ROA.
Model 3 includes the main effect variable committee organization tenure but was
insignificant and failed to significantly improve the base model. Model 4 is the full
model and significantly improved the analysis of the dependent variable (F = 1.629, p <
.10; R-square change = 0.036, p < .10). All analyses were two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.3 displays two sets of hierarchical OLS regression models used to
examine the relationship between committee education heterogeneity and firm
performance stability. Model 1 was the base model and is not significant. Model 2
includes the main effect variable committee education heterogeneity and significantly
improved the analysis of the dependent variable (F = 1.766, p < .10; R-square change =
0.020, p < .05). However, similar to Model 2 in Table 7, the low adjusted R-square value
of .048 does not adequately explain S.D. ROA alone.
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Table 3.2. Hierarchical OLS regression analysis: firm performancea
Model (1)
β
S.E.

Model (2)
β
S.E.

Model (3)
β
S.E.

Model (4)
β
S.E.

Control Variables
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples

0.014
0.030

0.025
0.028

0.012
0.026

0.025
0.027

0.002
0.030

0.031
0.034

0.016
0.028

Enery
Financials
Healthcare
Industrials
Information Technology

0.048
-0.008
0.024
0.018
0.023

0.030
0.027
0.026
0.025
0.025

0.050
-0.009
0.021
0.016
0.022

0.030
0.026
0.026
0.024
0.025

0.046
-0.007
0.026
0.018
0.024

0.038
0.033
0.032
0.030
0.030

0.053
-0.008
0.024
0.017
0.022

†

0.030
0.026
0.026
0.024
0.025

Materials
Telecommunication Services
Log Firm Size

0.042
0.049
-0.003

0.026
0.030
0.003

0.041
0.047
-0.004

0.026
0.029
0.003

0.043
0.049
0.000

0.032
0.036
0.003

0.047
0.048
-0.003

†

0.026
0.029
0.003

0.002 *

0.001
0.000

0.002

0.002 *
-0.002

0.001
0.001

Independent Variables
Company Tenure Heterogeneity
Committee Org Tenure
R2
Adjusted R

2

Change in R

0.063

0.086

0.053

0.093

0.015

0.034

0.000

0.036

.023*

-0.100

.036 †

†

0.994
206

1.629 †
204

2

F
N

0.025
0.028

1.316
208

1.670
208

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
a

β, unstandardized regression coefficients; S.E., standard error of the coefficients

Results for hypotheses 10, 12a and 12b can be found in Table 7. Hypothesis 10
predicts a positive relationship between high organizational tenure heterogeneity and
average firm performance. In Model 2, company tenure heterogeneity was positive and
significant (β = 0.002, p <.05); H8 is supported. Hypothesis 12a predicted a negative
relationship between strategic committee tenure and average organizational
performance while hypothesis 12b predicted a positive relationship. In Model 3,
committee organization tenure was positive, but not significant; H12a and H12b were not
supported.
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Table 3.3. Hierarchical OLS regression analysis: s.d. of firm performancea

Model (1)
β
S.E.

Model (2)
β
S.E.

Control Variables
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Enery
Financials
Healthcare

0.028
0.026
0.009
0.005
0.019

Industrials

0.011

†

Information Technology

0.029

†

Materials
Telecommunication Services
Log Firm Age

0.031
0.015
0.000

†

0.015
0.017
0.018
0.017
0.016

0.0260
0.0240
0.0080
0.0030
0.0180

0.015

0.0110

0.015
0.016
0.018
0.003

Independent Variable
Committee Education Heterogeneity
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R

0.015
0.017
0.018
0.017
0.016
0.015

0.0270

†

0.015

0.0300
0.0150
-0.0001

†

0.016
0.018
0.003

-0.025 *

0.012

0.086

0.111

0.028

0.048

2

F
N

†

0.020*
1.474
168

1.766 †
168

*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10
a

β, unstandardized regression coefficients; S.E., standard error of the coefficients

Results for hypothesis 11 can be found in Table 8. Hypothesis 9 predicts a
negative relationship between low education heterogeneity and firm stability. In Model
2, committee education heterogeneity was negative and significant (β = -0.025, p <.05); H11
is supported.
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DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This study represents an initial attempt to examine the relationship between
strategic committee member characteristics and firm performance. An upper echelon‟s
perspective suggests that large firms using strategic committees may look for certain
member characteristics to enhance firm performance. Three hypotheses result: (1)
strategic committees in large firms that contain more organization tenure heterogeneity
will on average perform better compared to large firms with strategic committees with
less organization tenure heterogeneity; (2) strategic committees with more education
heterogeneity in large firms will on average have greater performance stability than
strategic committees with less education heterogeneity in large firms; and (3) large
firms with strategic committees with greater tenure underperform compared to
strategic committee with less tenure.
Hypotheses 10 and 11 were supported (1 and 2 above, respectively). Using
company tenure heterogeneity as a proxy for strategic committee member experience
within the organization, findings indicate that lower organization experience
heterogeneity by committee members has a negative impact on performance; put
differently, large firms that have strategic committees with similar levels of experience,
typically long organization tenure, on average underperform compared to other large
firms with greater experience heterogeneity in strategic committees. For hypothesis 11,
committee education heterogeneity was a proxy for strategic committee education. The
analysis suggests that lower education heterogeneity within strategic committees leads
to greater performance instability within large organizations.
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At least two conclusions can be drawn from the empirical results. First, the
results imply that large organizations with strategic committees enhance performance
when members of the strategic committee have greater organization experience
heterogeneity. Secondly, large firms with strategic committees can better stabilize
performance by selecting committee members with greater education diversity. Lastly,
the results do not show a positive or negative relationship between organization tenure
of the strategic committee and firm performance; these results do not indicate the length
of time needed for an organization to reap the potential benefits, if any, of a strategic
committee. Thus, based on the empirical findings, greater strategic committee
heterogeneity in experience and education appears to have a positive influence on
performance and performance stability.
Two managerial implications are derived from the study and relate to committee
member selection. First, to enhance firm performance through the use of a strategic
committee, it would be in the firm‟s best interest to select a mix of individuals with
varying levels of organization experience; select people that are new and old to the
organization. I speculate that selecting only members with vast amounts of
organization experience hinder innovative thinking as they are primarily familiar with
current operations and possibly not best practices of the industry or non-similar firms.
In addition, by selecting only new members to the organization the strategic committee
is at a disadvantage as members are not currently familiar with organization operations
and may not be able to apply effective strategies in a reasonable time frame. Second,
improving performance stability may be possible by selecting strategic committee
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members with different educational backgrounds. It is not the level of education that
one achieves, but concepts and cognitive skills that come from education. By selecting
members from different educational backgrounds, a balance of cognitive abilities is
being created within the strategic committee; performance should be enhanced by
having strategic committee members with different mindsets, not similar. Thus, greater
heterogeneity in organization experience and education should lead to innovative
thinking and improved organizational operations.
Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. First, the sample only included publicly
traded companies. Future research may wish to extend these research questions by
examining non-publicly traded or private international firms. Second, relatively simple
constructs measured profits (ROA) and profit stability (S.D. ROA). Future research may
wish to develop and test other measures of firm performance. Third, strategic committee
organization tenure was not significant, which could simply be due to strategic
committees being a fairly new phenomenon; non-significance could be related to the
fact that the average age of a strategic committee is four to five years old. To examine
this phenomenon more closely, future research may want to explore this topic once
strategic committees have had a chance to get better established within organizations.
Finally, this paper raises additional research questions. For instance, could the
relationship between strategic committee age and firm performance be curvilinear? At
what point does a strategic committee become beneficial and/or harmful to the
organization? How does home cultural context impact the relationship between
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strategic committee members and performance? What are the performance differences
between strategic committees comprised primarily of internal members and strategic
committees comprised primarily of external members? Thus, this paper is research
opening, raising as many questions as it answers. Future efforts, by addressing these
and other questions, will be able to better explain strategic committee characteristics
and provide better guidance to firm managers who attempt to implement strategic
committees.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation sought to answer three research questions regarding strategic
committees: 1) is it possible to accurately predict which firms have strategic committees
(SCs) and do these firms perform better than firms without strategic committees; 2) in
what type of industries are strategic committees beneficial to firm performance; and 3)
what strategic committee characteristics lead to better firm performance? For Essays 1
and 2, nine hypotheses were created (six for Essay 1 and three for Essay 2) using the
“liabilities of newness” theory which states younger firms are more likely to fail
because they often lack key resources, experience and legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965)
and for that reason strategic committees that bring experience and legitimacy may
improve new firm performance. Essay 3 formulated three hypotheses based on upper
echelons theory proposing that large firm performance may be enhanced by certain top
management team characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
The three essays of this dissertation provide a starting point for studying a new
organizational phenomenon, the strategic committee. Due to (1) no prior systematic
research on SCs, (2) the relative newness and lack of commonality of the SC, and (3)
continual difficulty in realigning large organizations with dynamic environments and
external pressures, it is important to know are there possible benefits to having an SC
and do these benefits have contingent factors? This dissertation attempts to answer this
important question by first identifying the internal and external environmental
characteristics that led to the prediction of firms with a SC. Second, once firms with a
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SC were predicted, a comparison was done between firms with and without a SC.
Third, the performance of firms with a SC was then examined based on industry
characteristics of maturity, hypercompetitiveness, and experience curve effects. Lastly,
SC member characteristics of organizational tenure and educational heterogeneity were
examined in relation to firm performance.
Conclusions and Implications
Based on empirical findings, Essay 1 drew four primary conclusions. First, it
appears a SC is more likely to be present in firms with less experience and fewer
resources. Second, the probability of a firm having a SC increases with greater market
stability. Third, the probability of a firm having a SC decreases significantly for firms
with experience and for firms in unstable industries. Fourth, SC firms with less
experience and resources operating in more stable markets will on average have better
performance compared to firms without SCs. Thus, the empirical findings indicate that
the probability of a firm having a SC increase with lower experience/resource levels
and industry maturity. This leads to greater performance in firms with SCs compared
to firms without SCs.
Four managerial implications were derived for Essay 1. First, creating a SC may
provide legitimacy to external stakeholders as the name „strategic committee‟ signals
long-term orientation and is visible. Second, SCs can aid organizational effectiveness by
developing routines that enhance efficiencies in more stable markets. Third,
inexperienced firms may improve efficiencies by creating more formal structures
through the creation of a SC; inexperienced firms typically lack organizational structure
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which leads to operational inefficiencies. Fourth, firms should evaluate organization
experience, resources, and market stability prior to forming a SC to enhance
performance. Therefore, the creation of a SC may be in response to an organization‟s
lack of experience, resources, and/or legitimacy.
Essay 2 had three conclusions based on empirical results. First, the empirical
tests do not indicate if it is or is not beneficial to have a SC in more mature industries.
Second, it appears firms with a SC operating in less hypercompetitive industries will on
average have higher performance. Third, firms with a SC in more flat experience curve
industries will on average have higher performance. Hence, based on the empirical
findings, having a SC in non-hypercompetitive and flat experience curve industries has
a positive relationship with performance; having a SC is beneficial in specific industries
and enhances performance levels with decreased hypercompetition and experience
levels.
This resulted in two managerial implications. First, firms with a SC in nonhypercompetitive industries benefit more from the use of a SC as hypercompetitive
industries require constant innovation; constant innovation is derived from constant
information processing and established routines and processing. Second, firms with a
SC in flat experience curve industries benefit more than firms in steep experience curve
industries as flatter industries are characterized as being more stable. I speculate that
flat experience curve industries have greater competition intensity and market
saturation and therefore firms create a SC to maintain firm competitiveness.
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For Essay 3, empirical findings resulted in two conclusions. First, SC members
with greater organizational experience heterogeneity enhance performance in large
firms with a SC. Second, greater education heterogeneity within a SC leads to greater
performance stability in large firms with a SC. Lastly, no empirical results were found
for organization tenure of the SC and firm performance; put simply, the findings do not
indicate the necessary amount of time to reap the benefits, if any, of a strategic
committee. Thus I conclude that, based on my findings that greater SC heterogeneity in
experience and education has a positive impact on performance and performance
stability.
As a result, I derive two managerial implications. First, large firms with a SC can
enhance firm performance by selecting members with varying levels of organizational
experience; select people that are both new and old to the organization. I conjecture
that selecting only new members puts the organization at an operational disadvantage
as new members are not currently familiar with organizational routines and may not be
able to formulate effective strategies in a reasonable amount of time. Moreover, by only
selecting members with large amounts of organizational tenure, innovation may be
hindered as members are primarily familiar with current operations and not necessarily
best practices of the industry or non-similar firms. Lastly, performance stability in firms
with a SC can be enhanced by selecting members with varying levels of educational
backgrounds. By varying levels of education, I mean different educational
backgrounds, not level of education achieved. By selecting members with different
educational backgrounds, the firm is creating a more diverse cognitive foundation in
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which to base decision on. Firm performance stability is enhanced through SC
members with dissimilar educational backgrounds, not similar. Thus, greater
heterogeneity in organization experience and education should lead to innovative
thinking and improved organizational operations.

Limitations and Future Research
There were at least four limitations in this dissertation. First, my sample only
included publicly traded companies. Future research may wish to extend these research
questions by examining non-publicly traded or private international firms. Second, I
used simple constructs to measure profits (ROA), profit stability (S.D. ROA), firm
resources (number of employees), firm experience (firm age), firm maturity (average
change in ROA), hypercompetitiveness (R&D intensity) and experience curve effects
(capital intensity). Future research may wish to develop and test other measures of firm
performance, firm characteristics and industry characteristics. Third, this research only
examined environmental factors to predict which firms may have strategic committees
and did not look at the possible internal or political reasons why firms form such
committees.
Finally, firm maturity in Essay 2 and strategic committee organization tenure in
Essay 3 were not significant. Future research may wish to explore other measures of
firm and industry maturity to examine its impact on firm performance. Regarding
strategic committee organization tenure, non-significance could be because the average
age of the SC is only four years old; enough time may not have transpired between the
formation of a SC and the writing of this dissertation to find significant results. Future
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research may wish to re-explore this issue once SCs have had a chance to get better
established within organizations.
Finally, this dissertation raises additional research questions. For instance, why
do firms form strategic committees? Since this is an international study, how does
culture influence these findings? Are there specific types of firms that benefit from the
use of a strategic committee in hypercompetitive or steep experience curve industries?
At what point does a strategic committee become beneficial and/or harmful to the
organization? Thus, this dissertation is research opening, raising as many questions as
it answers. Future efforts, by addressing these and other questions, will be able to better
explain the role of the strategic committee and provide better guidance to firm
managers who attempt to implement strategic committees.
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APPENDIX
Coding categories for strategic committee educational backgrounds
1. Engineering
2. Science
3. Business Administration
4. Economics
5. Liberal Arts
6. Law (LL.B./J.D.)
7. Business (other than administration, e.g., accounting, finance)
8. Other
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